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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: John is 21 years old and enlisted
in the military after three years of post-high school unemployment. Sarah is
18 and enlisted immediately after graduating from high school to earn
money for college. Both are assigned to the same unit. Both live in the
same dormitory-style barracks on a base in the U.S. The base and the
nearby small town lack many outlets for entertainment. Most young
servicemembers assigned to the base spend their free time drinking while
watching movies or playing videos games in their barracks rooms.
John, Sarah, and a group of their friends often hang out in the barracks on
weekends. One Saturday night, a group has been drinking for several hours
in John's room. Their friends depart, leaving John and Sarah alone together
for the first time. Both are drunk, but Sarah is almost incoherent after
consuming nearly half of a bottle of vodka herself. She lies down on John's
bed. John follows shortly after.
The next day, something is wrong. Sarah texts her friend that she
cannot remember what happened, but that she thinks she might have been
raped. She cannot remember the details, but does recall brief images from
last night: images of John on top of her of him having sex with her. She
woke up in the morning unsure of what to do or whom to contact. Her
friend suggests talking to the sexual assault response coordinator on base.
Sarah does, and feels she remembers enough to conclude that she did not
consent to sex with John. She reports the incident.
A criminal investigation is initiated. Sarah provides a statement to
investigators, and John is questioned under rights advisement. There are no
other witnesses to the incident in question, although several servicemembers
tell investigators that both John and Sarah had been drinking heavily. The
investigators present their findings to John and Sarah's chain of command.
After several previous instances involving allegations of sexual misconduct
in the unit that went unpunished for various reasons, the commander feels
pressure from his superiors to correct a perceived climate of tolerance of
such behavior within his command.
The commander brings criminal charges against John and the case is
referred to a court-martial. The charges allege that John either had sex with
Sarah by force or threat of harm, or while she was unable to consent because
she was severely intoxicated. Prior to trial, John provides notice that he
intends to claim that either Sarah agreed to the sex, or that even if she did
not, he incorrectly but reasonably believed that she had. No other witnesses
or evidence corroborates either party's story: the trial will turn on the
court's assessment of the credibility of either Sarah's or John's version of
events.
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A story such as this, while truncated, is not unfamiliar to many in
the United States military.' Sexual assault is a particularly malicious and
tragic crime, intentionally inflicted on a victim who often suffers lasting
physical and psychological wounds. 2 As Justice White observed in Coker
v. Georgia, "[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the "'ultimate violation of self.' 3
Given the severity of this crime, the role of the military institution in
American society, and the complexity of gender relationships in the U.S.
military, efforts to combat military sexual assault must include
comprehensive education of military members and robust services and
support to victims. However, the most important tool available to a
commander to respond to military sexual assault is Article 120 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 4 which defines and prescribes
punishment of unlawful sexual conduct.
This article proposes that revisions to Article 120 enacted by
Congress in 2007,5 while well-intentioned and largely effective, require
further refinement to clarify the application of the concept of consent in
military sexual assault investigations and prosecutions. To support that
conclusion, we will first provide context regarding the history of U.S.
military sexual assault in Part II. Part III will then examine the legislative
history and development of the 2007 amendments to Article 120. Next, Part
IV will analyze legal challenges to the new legislative scheme, and identify
areas that require further interpretation and refinement. Finally, Part V
focuses on two of the most important areas in need of additional
interpretations. Part VI concludes.
II. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE U.S. MILITARY
Following is an overview of the circumstances and legal landscape
that led to the 2007 amendments. First, a review of the role of women in the
military will provide a background in which the crime of sexual assault
occurs, as the vast majority of victims are female.6 Next, we will examine
available statistics on the frequency of sexual assault, which may explain
why Congress perceived the need to enact the 2007 amendments. Finally,
we will analyze information regarding the effect of sexual assault on
1 See, e.g., Mic HUNTER, HONOR BETRAYED: SEXUAL ABUSE IN AMERICA'S MILITARY 165-166
(2007) (noting that an Army criminal investigator referred to such scenarios as "very
typical.").
2 Throughout this article, the term "sexual assault" will be used when discussing unlawful
sexual contact, as defined in Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 6495.01. See infra, Part
II.B.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
4 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2011).
sSee Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552(a)(1).
6 See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2009 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON SEXUAL
ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, 68 (March 2010) [hereinafter SAPRO FY09 REPORT]),
available at http://www.sapr.mil/media/pdf/reports/fy09_annual report.pdf.
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military society and effectiveness as an additional reason for changing the
criminal legislative scheme in an effort to more effectively address the
problem.
A. Women in the Military
An analysis of military sexual assault and associated military justice
responses should start with understanding the gender demographics of the
U.S. military. The active-duty military population in the Department of
Defense totals approximately 1.4 million members,' of which 14 percent are
women.8 Despite this relatively small proportion as compared to the general
U.S. population, the numbers of women in the military have consistently
increased over the last 40 years. After World War II, legal limitations on
the roles of women in the military returned after years of women filling
crucial roles supporting the war effort.9 In the 1950s and 1960s, women
comprised just over one percent of the active duty population, eventually
reaching two percent by the end of Vietnam.10 The end of mandatory
conscription in 1973 required a diversification and increase in the roles of
female servicemembers in the all-volunteer force, as the military faced a
shortage of qualified men to fill previously male-only positions." However,
despite the slow but steady increase in their numbers, by 2003 women were
still prohibited from working in 30 percent of available positions in the U.S.
Army. 12
As a result of the historical overrepresentation of men in its ranks,
the U.S. military may be, according to one sociologist, "the most
prototypically masculine of all social institutions."13  However, this male
dominance does not necessarily directly correlate with a prevalence for
sexual assault. One author has postulated that the "inherent implication of
inequality" due to grossly unequal representation of the sexes in the military
population, could provide some explanation for the "disproportionate rates
of unwanted sexual behavior experienced by women in the military" as
compared to civilian society. 14 While this imbalance and women's inability
to participate fully in all military occupational fields likely contributes to a
culture that may increase their experience of unwanted sexual conduct, a
7 See Armed Forces Strength Figures for April 30, 2011, available at
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/ms0.pdf.
8 See Department of Defense Female Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade, Sept.
30, 2010, available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rgl009f.pdf.
9 See David R. Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, Population Reference Bureau, America's




" Jessica L. Cornett, Note, The U.S. Military Responds to Rape: Will Recent Changes be
Enough?, 29 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 99, 100 (2008).
14 Id. at 102-103.
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more complete explanation of the reasons for military sexual assault should
consider a broader range of factors.' 5
B. Statistics on Instances of Military Sexual Assault
Whatever the institutional reasons that may contribute to the
problem, military sexual assaults are clearly numerous. Prior to 2004,
neither the Department of Defense (DoD) nor any of the service branches
routinely compiled statistics on sexual assault. A 1995 survey of military
members provides one source of pre-2004 information. Conducted after
several high-profile military sexual assault and sexual harassment
controversies,' 6 this survey found that 78 percent of female servicemembers
experienced unwanted sexual behavior in the military.17  However, the
accuracy of such surveys, while documenting an unacceptably high rate of
unwanted conduct in the DoD, may be skewed by the lack of a uniform
definition of "unwanted sexual behavior."
Recognizing both the problem of military sexual assault and the
lack of consistent data regarding it, in 2004 Congress passed legislation that
required the Secretary of Defense to submit annual public reports of sexual
assaults involving members of the armed forces.18 The law ordered DoD to
create a uniform definition of sexual assault.' 9 It required a report on the
number of sexual assaults committed by and against members of the armed
forces that were reported to military officials.20 DoD also must provide a
"synopsis of and the disciplinary action taken in" each substantiated case of
sexual assault. 2 1
In compliance with the 2004 law, DoD provided a definition of
sexual assault in a 2005 directive:
[I]ntentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force,
threats, intimidation, abuse of authority, or when the victim
does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault includes rape,
forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted
sexual contact that is aggravated, abusive, or wrongful (to
1s See, e.g., HUNTER, supra note 1, at 33-149 (discussing, among other topics, "the code of
hyper masculinity," hazing, prostitution, and homophobia as possible attributing factors to
military sexual assault).
See id. at 185-187 (listing scandals of military sexual abuse and assault, including incidents
at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Navy's 1991 Tailhook Convention, and the
U.S. Air Force Academy).
17 See Cornett, 29 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP, supra note 13, at 105.
See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1920, § 577(f) (2004) [hereinafter 2005 NDAA]).
" See id., 375, § 577(a)(3).
20 See id., 375, § 577(f)(2).
2 Id., 375, § 577(f)(2)(B).
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include unwanted and inappropriate sexual contact), or
attempts to commit these acts.22
This roughly matched several criminal offenses defined by Article 120 and
Article 12523 of the UCMJ at that time, as well as Article 8024 (attempts)
and Article 12825 (assault).
Annually since 2005, DoD has complied with the law by publishing
the required reports, including analysis of the data and observations
regarding trends. For example, in fiscal year 2009, DoD reported 3230
incidents of sexual assault involving military members, representing an 11
percent increase from 2008 and a 20 percent increase from 2007.26
Furthermore, as a proportion of the total active-duty population, the
frequency of reported sexual assaults by servicemembers shows a similar
increase over the same time period, from 1.6 reports per thousand
servicemembers in 2007 to 2.0 reports per thousand in 2009.
According to the 2009 report, this increase may be attributed, in
part, to DoD policies promulgated in 2005 that encourage victims of alleged
sexual assaults to report those incidents. These policies include enhanced
victims' services and available confidential reporting procedures.27 Despite
these new policies, the report also notes that separate DoD studies indicate
that only "20 percent of servicemembers who experience unwanted sexual
contact report the matter to a military authority." 28 Therefore, this trend of
underreporting likely indicates that the real number of sexual assaults is
much higher.
Finally, the 2009 report also includes demographic and geographic
data of instances of sexual assault that provide a more detailed picture of the
military sexual assault problem. In 2009, 91 percent of victims of sexual
assault reported to authorities were female. 2 9  Furthermore, 279 reports
alleged sexual assaults in "combat areas of interest," primarily those
countries. in and around the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. 30  This
represented a 16 percent increase from the number reported in 2008.3
22 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DiR. 6495.01, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVExnON AND RESPONSE (SAPR)
PROGRAM, End 2, para. 1.13 (2008), aenilableathttp/www.dtic.mil/whs/diectives/conespdi649501p.pdf
23 See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2011).
24 See 10 U.S.C. §880 (2011).
25 See 10 U.S.C. §928 (2011).
26 See SAPRO FY09 REPORT, supra note 6, at 58-59.
27 See id.
28 id.
29 See id at 69.
30 Id. at 76.
" See id.
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Although the number of servicemembers deployed to these combat
areas varies constantly, at the end of 2008 the total was approximately
294,000.32 Therefore, the rate of sexual assaults per thousand
servicemembers in these locations is approximately 0.94, less than half of
the 2.0 rate per thousand reported for the overall DoD. This lower rate is
likely due to the "arduous conditions" that make "data collection very
difficult" in theater, 33 and is at odds with well-documented reports of sexual
assaults in Iraq and Afghanistan.34
C. Effects of Sexual Assault in the Military
"The Department has a no-tolerance policy toward sexual assault. This type
of act not only does unconscionable harm to the victim; it destabilizes the
workplace and threatens national security. "
- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, March 201031
"The Department does not tolerate sexual assault of any kind. Such acts
are an affront to the institutional values of the Armed Forces of the United
States of America. Sexual assault harms individuals, undermines military
readiness, and weakens communities. "
- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, May 20056
Sexual assault causes numerous effects, which can be classified in
two ways. Obviously the victim suffers direct psychological and
physiological harm, as well as indirect harm based on her perception of the
military's response to the incident if she reported it. Sexual assault also
threatens the military's fundamental principles of trust, honor, and respect, if
the response fails to reflect prompt and thorough investigation, and fair
disposition (including adjudication) of such allegations.
Unlike physical injuries, time alone does not heal the psychological
effects of sexual assault on victims. In fact, a 2005 study of veterans of the
1991 Gulf War found that "high combat exposure and sexual
harassment/assault" most commonly triggered the Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder diagnosed among the participants 37 Furthermore, military sexual
assaults result in direct and indirect fiscal costs to DoD, in terms of
32 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS No. R40682, TROOP
LEVELS IN THE AFGHAN AND IRAQ WARS, FY2001-FY2012: COST AND OTHER POTENTIAL
ISSUES, (July 2, 2009), at 6, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf.
33 SAPRO FY09 REPORT, supra note 6, at 76.
34 See, e.g., Sara Corbett, The Women's War, N.Y.TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 18, 2007.
3 SAPRO FY09 REPORT, supra note 6, at i.
36 Memorandum from Sec'y of Def. to Secretaries of Military Departments, et al, (May 3,
2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Memo]).
37 Id. at 182.
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personnel retention, recruiting, and long term medical treatment. While
difficult to estimate, these costs are likely quite large.
Sexual assaults also seriously and negatively impact military
effectiveness and unit cohesion. For example, the effective operation of a
military unit requires trust between fellow servicemembers and also up and
down the command and leadership chain. Sexual assault necessarily
damages this fragile and critical state of trust, particularly in cases involving
one member alleging an offense committed against them by a fellow
member, and where such matters inevitably occupy the attention of all
members of the unit.
Furthermore, an allegation of sexual assault will often affect a unit
even more directly. For example, the military will not normally permit an
accused servicemember to change duty stations or deploy during the
investigation and adjudication of allegations against them. 39 Likewise,
receiving medical treatment and other support services, as well as the
necessity of participation with investigators and attorneys, will nearly
always preclude a victim's effective contribution to the mission of their
unit. 4 0 Furthermore, investigation and adjudication may also involve and
require the additional participation of other unit members, thereby
magnifying the impact.
These negative individual and group effects caused by incidents of
military sexual assault likely persuaded Congress to consider changes
intended to combat the problem. Modifying the existing legal framework in
order to enable more effective criminal prosecution of military sexual
assault would advance both military needs and the rule of law-foundations
of the military justice system. Improving punishment of sexual misconduct
would further military necessity by reducing negative group effects of
sexual assault.
However, any change in the legislative scheme that criminalizes
sexual assault in order to further the rule of law must be balanced against
equally important considerations to protect and preserve the rights of the
accused. According to one author, provisions such as the recent changes in
military sexual assault prosecution place "little to no value upon the
substantive or procedural rights of an accused, or to the fundamental
fairness implicit in the guarantees of due process." 4 1 Thus, according to
these authors, while society does have a military necessity interest in the
immediate response to a sexual assault victim, there is an equal rule of law
3 See TERRI T.S. NELSON, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: CONFRONTING RAPE AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY, 189-213 (2001).
3 See Major Jennifer S. Knies, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Why the New UCMJ's
Rape Law Missed the Mark, and How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put it Back on
Target, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2007, at 1 4.
40 See id.
41 Lieutenant Keith B. Lofland, The Neglected Debate Over Sexual Assault Policy in the
Department ofDefense, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 311, 313 (2008).
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interest in ensuring that any prosecution of the accused is a fair process. 42 A
proper examination of recent Congressional responses to the problem of
military sexual assault must include an assessment of these competing
interests.
III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE "NEW" ARTICLE 120
Beginning with the 2004 legislation requiring annual reports
detailing the instances of military sexual assault, Congress began to address
the problem it perceived. The statistics denoting the pervasiveness of
military sexual assault discussed supra, in addition to several cases of
military sexual abuse highlighted in the media, certainly contributed to
Congress' agenda to consider structural reforms within the military justice
system in order to better combat the problem.
Additionally, some military courts noted the limited nature of the
pre-2007 Article 120, particularly that it did not "reflect the more recent
trend for rape statutes to recognize gradations in the offense based on
context." 4 3 Overall, a review of the legislative history of the amended
Article 120 sets the stage for a proper analysis of recent judicial
interpretations and proposals for modification to the statute.
A. Congressional Request for Options
President Bush signed the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005 on October 28, 2004." In
addition to the sections requiring the annual reporting of instances of sexual
assaults and the creation of a uniform definition of sexual assault, the 2005
NDAA also required the Secretary of Defense to
[R]eview the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Manual for Courts-Martial with the objective of
determining what changes are required to improve the
ability of the military justice system to address issues
relating to sexual assault and to conform the Uniform Code
of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial more
closely to other Federal laws and regulations that address
45such issues.
Thus, in an attempt to address the problem of military sexual assault,
Congress sought proposals from the DoD to modify the UCMJ, implicitly
42 See id. at 330.
43 United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005) ("Article 120 is antiquated in its
approach to sexual offenses.").
4See 2005 NDAA, supra note, at 18.
45 Id., §571(a) (emphasis added).
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recognizing that the provisions in the UCMJ that dealt with sexual assault
required modification for improvement.
A subcommittee of DoD's Joint Service Committee (JSC) for
Military Justice took up the task of developing recommendations to go to
Congress. The JSC is comprised of representatives of the major
stakeholders in the DoD's uniformed and civilian legal community, and is
responsible, in part, for reviewing the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM)
and proposing updates to the UCMJ. 4 6 The subcommittee reviewed the
then-current UCMJ, MCM, several federal criminal statutes, and the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, and, ultimately presented
DoD's recommendations to Congress in March 2005.47
The subcommittee unanimously recommended against any changes
to the UCMJ. Its members could identify no military sexual misconduct that
could not be effectively prosecuted under the existing UCMJ and MCM. 48
Furthermore, the JSC subcommittee asserted that any "rationale for
significant change [would be] outweighed by the confusion and disruption
that such change would cause."4 9 Finally, the subcommittee emphasized
that given the "well-developed, sophisticated jurisprudence" in the military
justice system, changes in the UCMJ or other regulations would not likely
result in any significant increase in prosecutions of sexual offenses.o
However, the subcommittee further stated that "if higher authorities
direct a UCMJ change to substantially conform to [federal criminal law],"
one of potential changes it had considered represented the option "that best
takes into account unique military requirements."51  This option would
divide sexual misconduct into degrees according to various aggravating
factors.52 Despite the fact that the subcommittee explicitly advocated no
change in existing law as necessary or prudent to deal with the problem of
military sexual assault, this option soon formed the basis of the amendments
to Article 120 that Congress later enacted.
46 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD DIR. 5500.17, ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE (JSC) ON MILITARY JUSTICE (2003), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/550017p.pdf.
47 Sex Crimes and the UCMJ: A Report for the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice at 1 (Feb.
2005) available at http://www.defenselink.mil/dodge/php/docs/subcommitteereportMarkHarveyl-13-
05.doc, [hereinafter Sex Crimes and the UCMJ].
48 d
491 d. at 2.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 85.
s3 See Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Johnson, Forks in the Road: Recent Developments in
Substantive Criminal Law, ARMY LAw., Jun. 2006, at 27 (referencing discussions with a
House Armed Services Committee attorney who served as a member of a drafting committee
for the new sexual assault legislation).
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B. The "New" Article 120
Contrary to the primary recommendation of the DoD subcommittee,
the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act included a complete rewrite of
Article 120.54 Unfortunately for those seeking to understand Congress'
intent, the available legislative history provides little explanation of the
specific reasons or purposes for the complete revision.
For example, the report of the House Committee on Armed
Services' version of the NDAA included only one paragraph summarizing
the rewrite of the article." Furthermore, the Conference Report on the
combined House and Senate bill noted that the Senate version of the NDAA
bill did not include a revision to Article 120.56 Additionally, floor debate in
Congress contains only a single apparent reference to the rewrite.
Representative Loretta Sanchez of California noted that the rewritten Article
120 provided for a "modern complete sexual assault statute that protects
victims [and] empowers commanders and prosecutors."57 Furthermore, she
stated that the amended statute "affords increased protection for victims by
emphasizing acts of the perpetrator rather than the reaction of the victim
during the assault."5 8
The President signed the 2006 NDAA and its Article 120 rewrite
into law on January 6, 2006.59 According to the statute, the new Article 120
would not go in to effect until October 1, 2007.60 The revised article now
specifies 14 categories of sexual assault offenses, including rape, aggravated
sexual assault, aggravated sexual contact, and abusive sexual contact.
Understanding the categories of offenses under the revised article
requires first examining the definitions of "sexual act" and "sexual contact."
The statute defines a "sexual act" as contact between the penis and vulva or
penetration of a genital opening of another by hand, finger, or other object
with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade, or to arouse or gratify
sexual desire.62 It defines "sexual contact" as the intentional touching of
another with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade, or to arouse
or gratify sexual desire.63 After initially identifying the nature of the
conduct between the perpetrator and the victim, determination of the
54 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119
Stat. 3137 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NDAA].
5 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-089, § 555 (2005) (noting that the amended Article 120 would
include both "a series of graded offenses relating to rape, sexual assault and other sexual
misconduct" and "a precise description of each offense.").
56 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-360, § 552 (2005).
5 151 Cong. Rec. H3912-02, 3920 (2005).
58 id.
59 See 2006 NDAA supra note, at 54.
6 See id.
61 See 10 U.S.C. § 920, (a) - (h) (2011).
62 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(1).
63 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(2).
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specific offense then requires further consideration of numerous aggravating
factors, including the use of weapons, force, or threats of bodily harm.,6
Along with the enumeration of several new offenses, the amended
Article 120 includes two other important changes. First, the statute
eliminated the previous requirement in rape and sexual assault prosecutions
that the government prove the accused committed the sexual conduct
without the consent of the victim. The new Article 120 replaced this
requirement with provisions for the accused to raise and assert consent, and
reasonable mistake of fact as to consent, as affirmative defenses to the
alleged offenses of rape, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual
contact, or abusive sexual contact.6 5  This differs considerably from the
previous version of Article 120, which required the government to prove the
accused committed the act of sexual intercourse, with force, and without
consent.6
Second, the new Article 120 requires an accused that raises the
affirmative defense(s) of consent and/or reasonable mistake of fact as to
consent, to support the defense(s) by a preponderance of the evidence.67
After the defense satisfies this initial quantum of proof, the burden of proof
then shifts to the government to disprove the existence of consent or
reasonable mistake of fact as to consent, beyond a reasonable doubt.68
These two provisions effect the changes worked by the new
legislative scheme, as Representative Sanchez described them: that the law
will now shift the focus of sexual assault prosecutions away from the victim
and toward the conduct of the accused. However, these two provisions
triggered very serious appellate challenges that have resulted in judicial
conclusions that the new law may be unconstitutional. The new law clearly
needs further legislative refinement and interpretation to survive further
scrutiny and to further Congress' apparent intent.
IV. APPELLATE CHALLENGES AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Even before the newly revised Article 120 became effective in
October 2007, several commentators detailed possible problems with the
amendments shortly after its enactment.69 Using these critiques, military
defense counsel almost immediately attacked the constitutionality and
application of the amended article as soon as accused members were
charged with offenses under it. Since its enactment, each of the services'
Criminal Courts of Appeal, as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
6 See 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(3) - (t)(8).
65 See 10 U.S.C. § 920(r).
6 See Johnson, supra note 57, at 27.
67 See 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(16).
6 See id.
69 See, e.g., Major Howard H. Hoege III, ""Overshift" The Unconstitutional Double Burden-
Shift on Affirmative Defenses in the New Article 120, ARMY LAW., May 2007, at 2.
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Armed Forces, has now considered and decided several of these challenges.
The resulting decisions have caused significant uncertainty and concern in
the military justice system. Agreeing with the early critics, those decisions
have concluded that in some (and perhaps most or even all) cases, the new
statute impermissibly and unconstitutionally shifts part of the burden of
proof to the accused.
According to challengers, the revised article's definitions of force,
"substantially incapacitated," and consent, combined with the removal of the
previous element of lack of consent which the government had to prove,
now unconstitutionally require an accused who raises the affirmative
defense of consent to disprove an element of the alleged crime for which the
government must satisfy the ultimate burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Challenges such as this embody the aforementioned dangers of
legislative overreach and have been addressed in United States v.
Crotchett,70 United States v. Neal,7 and United States v. Prather.72
A. United States v. Crotchett
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (N-M.C.C.A)
tackled an iteration of the burden shifting challenge in Crotchett. In that
case, the government charged a Sailor with aggravated sexual assault under
Article 120(c), claiming that the alleged victim was substantially incapable
of communicating her willingness to engage in sexual intercourse with the
accused.73 At trial, the accused raised the affirmative defense of consent.74
After hearing arguments, the trial court dismissed the charge and
specification against the accused, ruling that the prosecution would violate
the accused's Fifth Amendment right to due process by unconstitutionally
shifting the burden of proof to the defense to disprove an essential element
of the offense." Specifically, this essential element was the alleged victim's
substantial incapacity to communicate her unwillingness.76 In short, the
accused argued that in order to show that the alleged victim consented to
intercourse, he would have to show that she did have the capacity to
communicate her willingness, which is the logical opposite of the
government's element.
The appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court." In
analyzing the lower court's ruling, the appellate court acknowledged an
"apparent overlap of defense and government burdens" when the affirmative
70 United States v. Crotchett, 67 M.J. 713 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2009)), rev. denied, 68 M.J.
222 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
n United States v. Neal, 68 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 121 (2010).
72 United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338, reconsideration denied, 70 M. 30 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
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defense of consent is raised in a trial of aggravated sexual assault.78 The
appellate court distinguished these burdens by parsing what specifically the
parties must prove in order to meet their respective burdens, either when
raising an affirmative defense or when proving the elements of the offense.
First, according to the statute's definition of consent, the accused
must show that the alleged victim used "words or overt acts indicating a
freely given agreement to the sexual conduct at issue by a competent
person."7 9  The court determined the accused need only show that the
alleged victim (1) uttered words or performed an overt act that (2) indicated
a freely given agreement.80 Unlike the government, which must prove that
the alleged victim was actually substantially incapable of communicating
unwillingness, the accused need only show that the alleged victim
objectively manifested consent.8 1 Thus, instead of shifting the burden of
proof to the accused, the Crotchett court held that the accused's burden of
proof to raise the affirmative defense of consent is similar, but distinct and
separate from, the government's ultimate burden of proof to sustain a
criminal conviction.
B. United States v. Neal
While Crotchett dealt with the question of consent where the
alleged victim was allegedly substantially incapable of communicating her
unwillingness, Neal involved a case of purported burden shifting where the
accused attempted to use the affirmative defense of consent in a prosecution
for aggravated sexual contact under Article 120(e).82 As an example of the
graduated levels of misconduct punishable under the new Article 120, the
government in Neal had to prove that the accused (1) engaged in sexual
contact, (2) by force, and (3) with the intent to arouse, abuse, or humiliate.83
After the accused raised the consent defense, the trial court dismissed the
charge against him by interpreting Article 120(e) "as requiring the defense
to disprove an implied element, [the] lack of consent," which therefore
"unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof on an element from the
government to the defense."84 After the government appealed the trial
court's ruling, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case, and the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy certified several issues for review by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.).
" See id. at 715.
7 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(14).
80 See Crotchett, 67 M.J. at 715.
81 See id.
82 See Neal, 68 M.J. at 291.
8 See id. at 297.
" Id. at 291.
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On appeal to C.A.A.F., the accused argued that his assertion of the
affirmative defense of consent created an "implicit element" that the law
requires him to disprove the element of force for which the government
must satisfy the burden of proof.85  The accused argued that for the
government to prove the element of force, it must necessarily also prove
lack of consent, because "[o]ne does not submit if willing, one need not be
overcome if willing, and one does not resist that which one wants."8 Thus,
the accused advocated that asserting an affirmative defense of consent
required him to disprove lack of consent (i.e., by showing that there was
consent), which thereby improperly shifted the burden of proof from the
government to him.
C.A.A.F. disagreed and affirmed the decision of the appellate
court. The court held that, at least in a prosecution under Article 120(e),
the burden of proof does not shift to the accused when the accused raises the
affirmative defense of consent. The court noted the purpose of the revised
statute to focus on the conduct of the accused and not on the mental state of
the victim.89 Much like the Crotchett court, C.A.A.F. in Neal focused on the
government's burden. Specifically, the court noted the government need not
prove whether the victim was, in fact, not willing to submit if it were not for
the forceful conduct of the accused. 90 Rather, the court noted that "if the
evidence demonstrates that the degree of force applied by an accused
constitutes 'action to compel' [the alleged victim], the statute does not
require further proof that the alleged victim, in fact, did not consent."91
Thus, by parsing the limits of what the government must prove, C.A.A.F.
held that assertion of the affirmative defense of consent does not
unconstitutionally shift the burden to the accused.
C. United States v. Prather
In Prather, C.A.A.F. addressed the affirmative defense of consent in
a prosecution under Article 120(c)(2).9 2 The facts in Prather resemble the
scenario in our introduction, supra: the victim testified that she passed out
due to intoxication and awoke to find the accused on top of and penetrating
her, but the accused claimed they had consensual intercourse.93 After the
presentation of evidence, the military judge then "engaged counsel in a
lengthy discussion concerning the instructions he intended to give the
8 Neal, 68 M.J. at 302.
86 id.





92 Prather, 69 M.J. at 341-43.
9 See id. at 340-41.
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members" for the sexual assault charged under Article 120(c)(2). 94 During
this discussion, defense counsel requested that the military judge instruct the
members in accordance with the Military Judges' Benchbook,9s which
suggested treating consent as a traditional affirmative defense.96 The
military judge denied the defense request and issued instructions that
"generally tracked the statutory scheme, including the shifting burdens
consistent with Article 120(t)(16)... with respect to the affirmative
defenses." 97 After the accused was convicted of aggravated sexual assault
in violation of Article 120(c)(2), on review the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals found no violation of the accused's due process rights."
Unlike in Neal, where the court took significant interpretative steps
to uphold the constitutionality of the burden shifting scheme under Article
120(e), C.A.A.F. held in Prather that, at least as applied to the facts of this
case, the interplay between Article 120(c)(2), Article 120(t)(14), and Article
120(t)(16) "results in an unconstitutional burden shift to the accused."99 In
Neal, the court rejected the argument that the government's burden to prove
force required a corollary proof of lack of consent. However, in Prather,
the court found such a connection between the government's burden of
proof and a necessary element for an affirmative defense. The court stated
that while there may be some "abstract distinction" between the terms
"substantially incapacitated" in Article 120(c)(2) and "substantially
incapable" in Article 120(t)(14), "in the context presented here we see no
meaningful constitutional distinction in analyzing the burden shift." 00 Thus,
according to the court, the accused in Prather could not prove consent
without first proving that the victim had the capacity to consent.o'0 The
court continued by holding that even though the military judge instructed the
members consistent with the text of Article 120, "the statutory scheme Was
not cured by the military judge's instructions."l 02
In addition, the court continued its analysis of Article 120 by
addressing the propriety of the second burden shift in Article 120(t)(16).'o3
Although holding the initial burden shift under Article 120(t)(16)
unconstitutional mooted further analysis of the second burden shift, the
court agreed with the accused that "the second burden shift is a legal
9 4 Id. at 340.
9 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9 (Jan. 1, January 2010), available at
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/p27 9.pdf (The Benchbook is utilized by military judges in
courts-martial through all four branches of service) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-9].
96 See Prather, 69 M.J. at 340.
9 Id. at 340.
98 Id.
9 Prather, 69 M.J.at 340-343.
'" Id. at 343.
101 See id
'02 Id. at 344
103 See id. at 344-45.
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impossibility."'0 Similar to prior criticisms of the second burden shift
scheme,'os the court noted that the problem is structural: if a trier of fact has
found that an affirmative defense is proven by a preponderance of the
evidence, it is legally impossible for the government to disprove that
affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.106  In a separate opinion,
Judge Baker went further in his criticism of Article 120(t)(16), calling the
second burden shift unenforceable and unconstitutional if literally
followed.'07
Prather creates significant unresolved questions as to how to apply
the new Article 120 in future cases. 08 While the majority opinion did not
explicitly limit its constitutional holding "as applied" only to the facts in that
case, several limiting phrases seem to indicate that the majority intended to
constrain the scope of its decision.109 However, the apparent limited nature
of Prather is complicated by the majority's response to Judge Baker's
criticism of the majority's failure to indicate what instruction by the military
judge, if any, could cure the constitutional deficiencies identified in the first
burden shift. In a footnote, the majority states that no instruction "could
have cured the error where the members already had been instructed in a
manner consistent with the text of Article 120."'110 Thus, while the Prather
court appears to have taken steps to limit its holding to the facts presented,
its assertion that no plausible instruction could resolve the "constitutional
and textual difficulties" may have seemed to permit a wider interpretation of
the case.
However, in United States v. Boore, the Air Force's appellate court
firmly reversed a trial decision by a military judge who adopted that wider
interpretation, and threw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater.112 I
Boore, the accused was charged with abusive sexual contact with the alleged
victim while she was substantially incapacitated, among other offenses. 113
' Id., at 345 n.10.
1os See Hoege, supra note 69, at 15.
106 See Prather, 69 M.J. at 345.
107 See id at 347-351-52 (Baker, J., dissenting as to Part A and concurring in the result).
108 See, e.g., Marcus Fulton, CAAF Provides Answers, Raises Questions in Prather, CAAFLOG
(Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.caaflog.com/2011/02/09/caaf-provides-answers-raises-
questions-in-prather/.
See Prather, 69 M.J. at 340 ("...the statutory interplay between the relevant provisions of
Article 120 ... under these circumstances, results in an unconstitutional burden shift to the
accused." (emphasis added)); Id. at 345 ("As we have found that the initial burden shift in
Article 120(t)(16) . . . to be unconstitutional under the circumstances presented in this case,
the issue involving the second burden shift becomes moot." (emphasis added)).
"
0 Id. at 344, n.9.
.. Id. In addition, Prather's holding should have no blanket effect on the applicability of the
holding in Crotchett. Where Prather dealt with the burden shifting scheme as applied to a
charge under Article 120(c)(2) ("substantially incapacitated"), Crotchett involved the burden
shifting scheme as analyzed in a charge under Article 120(c)(2)(C) ("substantially incapable
of... communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act.").
112 United States v. Boore, Misc. Dkt. No. 2011-01 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App., Aug. 3, 2011).
... See id. at 1.
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He argued that similar to Prather, in order for him to show consent or a
mistake of fact as to consent, he would have to prove the alleged victim was
not substantially incapacitated and therefore would be forced to disprove an
element of the offense.1 14 The trial judge ruled in the accused's favor, and
dismissed the abusive sexual contact charge as unconstitutional. In his
ruling, the judge stated that C.A.A.F. in Prather had held the entire Article
120 to be constitutionally unenforceable, and that he lacked authority to
sever (t)(16) or to provide curative instructions - because, he said C.A.A.F.
in the subsequent case of United States v. Medina had prohibited such a
remedy, and he held it would render the remainder of the statute incoherent
and invade and contravene Congressional intent."s
Upon appeal of the judge's decision by the Government," 6 the court
held that the trial judge had erred to the extent that he found Article 120 to
be facially unconstitutional, and/or that he asserted that C.A.A.F. had so
held in Prather."7 The court further held that C.A.A.F. had not prohibited
application of the canon of constitutional avoidance by severance." 8 The
court found "no difficulty" in remedying the constitutional infirmity by
severing out Article 120(t)(16)'s requirement that the accused prove the
affirmative defense, by a preponderance of the evidence, from the remainder
of the statute." 9 The court further observed that this would not frustrate
Congressional intent:
[I]t is clear . . . that the law's purpose is to criminalize
sexual assault by military members. While Congress may
have wanted to put more of a burden on the accused with
respect to proving an affirmative defense, it is unrealistic to
believe that Congress would have preferred to have the
entire statute invalidated and thereby leave commanders
without a means to prosecute sexual assault crimes rather
than simply eliminating the offending burden shifting
provision. 120
The complex analyses in these cases demonstrate that Article 120
"is neither a model of clarity nor a model statute."'21 While the courts in
Crotchett and Neal strained to reject constitutional challenges to the
provision, in at least one case C.A.A.F. has found the burden shifting
scheme of Article 120 to be unconstitutional as to the facts presented. The
114 See id.
"s See id. at 2, citing United States v. Medina, 69 M.J 462, 465 n.5, reconsideration denied,
70 M.J. 35 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
116 See U.C.M.J. Article 62, 10 U.S.C. §862(a)(1)(A).
117 Boore, slip op. at 3.
... See id. at 3-4.
"' See id at 4.
120 See id. at 5.
121 Neal, 68 M.J. at 305 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Air Force's appellate court subsequently followed in a case with similar
facts. Prather and Boore do much to clarify the legal landscape and map the
course to constitutionally adjudicate Article 120 cases where the accused
raises the affirmative defense - while preserving the remainder of the statute
and legislative scheme. However, only Congressional action to clarify and
enhance Article 120 will avert continuing difficulty and potential confusion
in the military courts in this area.
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES
Article 120 requires amendments to ensure a constitutional
application of the article and to reduce confusion during sexual assault
prosecutions. Two such changes include (1) a redefinition of consent in
Article 120(r) and (2) an amendment of the procedures used when raising
the affirmative defense of consent under Article 120(t)(16).
A. Redefine the Use of Consent in Article 120(r)
One suggested change is a legislative redefinition of the use of
consent in Article 120(r). This unnecessarily confusing provision provided
the textual support for the burden shifting challenges in Crotchett, Neal, and
Prather. According to the current statute, "consent and mistake of fact as to
consent are not an issue, or an affirmative defense, in a prosecution under
any other subsection, except they are an affirmative defense for the sexual
conduct in issue in a prosecution" for several offenses under Article 120,
such as rape and aggravated sexual contact.122
Refining what is meant by "consent" will clarify Congress' intent
regarding the treatment of evidence of an alleged victim's permission, as
introduced by either the accused or the government. In Neal, the court
declined to broadly interpret the phrase, rejecting the interpretation that
would never allow the use of consent evidence except when the accused
meets his initial burden to establish an affirmative defense.123 According to
the Neal court, although the government need not prove lack of consent,
evidence regarding consent should be allowed in order to "not preclude
treating evidence of consent as a subsidiary fact potentially relevant to a
broader issue in the case, such as the element of force." 24
Despite the court's interpretation in Neal, Congress should
undertake to clarify the evidentiary role of consent. If the revised article
intends to emphasize the acts of the perpetrator rather than the reaction of
the victim, restricting use of consent evidence would protect against
investigating what a victim allegedly did or said during a sexual assault.
The "New" Article 120 287
122 10 U.S.C. § 920(r).
123 Neal, 68 M.J. at 301-02.
124 Id. at 304.
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Such a limitation of consent would run counter to the Article 120(r) analysis
in Neal, but would more effectively fulfill Congress' apparent intentions.
Therefore, a simple legislative fix would better articulate Congress'
desire regarding the use of consent in Article 120(r). Congress may amend
Article 120(r) to read "evidence of consent and mistake of fact as to consent
is not to be admitted in a prosecution under any subsection, except for the
purpose of an affirmative defense...." If enacted, this change would resolve
the different interpretations presented in Neal and would protect victims
from embarrassing revelations.
B. Amend the Affirmative Defense Procedures in Article 120(t)(16)
A second recommended refinement of the article involves the
procedural aspects of the use of affirmative defenses under Article
120(t)(16). According to this section, raising an affirmative defense in a
sexual assault prosecution triggers a two-step process. First, "[t]he accused
has the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of
evidence."l 25 Second, "[a]fter the defense meets this burden, the prosecution
shall have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
affirmative defense did not exist."1 26
Specifically, Congress should clarify (1) who determines whether
the accused has met his initial burden, and (2) when during the trial the
accused must meet that first burden. However, the statute provides no
guidance as to whether the military judge or the panel of members decides
that question, or the timing of that decision. While the statute does require
that the accused must prove consent existed by a preponderance of the
evidence, 127 this choice of a burden of proof standard is a clear indication
the determination is a question of fact for the fact-finder.
According to one author, neither C.A.A.F. nor any of the service
appellate courts has endorsed splitting this fact-finding role between the
military judge and panel. 12 Furthermore, if the members bear the
responsibility to determine whether the accused met his burden, the second
step of the process is nonsensical "as the fact-finder would be asked to
consider whether or not reasonable doubt exists in the identical evidence the
fact-finder just used to conclude that, more likely than not, the defense
exists."l 29 The illogical nature of Article 120(t)(16) formed the basis of the
Prather court's condemnation of the burden shifting scheme.
C.A.A.F. has yet to definitively endorse an instruction for the
procedures provided in Article 120(t)(16). C.A.A.F. declined to address the
Article 120(t)(16) instruction issue in Neal, noting that while the trial judge
125 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(16).
126 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(16).
127 See id.
128 See Hoege, supra note 69 at 12.
129 id
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"identified interpretative considerations" in applying the procedures in
Article 120(t)(16), review of the lower court's ruling was not required as the
trial court did not dismiss the charge based on that section. 13 0 However, in
Prather the court noted that, at least in the circumstances presented, there
existed no plausible instruction (presumably including those suggested in
the Benchbook) that would cure the "constitutional and textual difficulties"
found in applying the burden shifting scheme. 13 1 Additionally, in United
States v. Medina, C.A.A.F. held that it was harmless error for a military
judge, without a legally sufficient explanation, to give an instruction
consistent with the Benchbook's instruction. 132
Finally, in a case originally tried in September 2009, C.A.A.F. very
recently signaled that it will revisit (and perhaps further clarify) its previous
ruling in Prather. In United States v. Stewart, C.A.A.F. granted review to
answer whether "it [is] legally possible for the prosecution to disprove an
affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt once the military judge has
determined that the defense has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence and, if not, is the military judge required to enter a finding of not
guilty in such a case under R.C.M. 917?"' 1 At trial, the military judge had
applied Article 120(t)(16) and found that the defense had introduced
sufficient evidence of consent and mistake of fact as to consent to meet its
preponderance burden. 13 4 However, when he instructed the members on
findings, the judge omitted any reference to the accused's burden of proof or
persuasion on the affirmative defenses, and simply placed the burden on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged victim did
not consent to the sexual act and that the accused did not reasonably and
honestly believe that she had. On appeal, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals found no error in that approach.135  However, the
appellant also unsuccessfully argued that the judge's finding that he proved
the affirmative defenses by a preponderance precluded a subsequent finding
of guilt by the members. 136 C.A.A.F. now intends to hear argument on that
point. It seems very likely that C.A.A.F. will agree with the lower court, but
the fact that it will soon issue another opinion on the subject signals the
continuing challenges of constitutionally applying the statutory scheme.
In the face of these confusing procedures, the Military Judges'
Benchbook, which establishes pattern instructions and suggested procedures
for courts-martial, advises military judges to sidestep the problematic
burden-shifting scheme entirely. Following Neal and Prather, the Army
amended the Benchbook's instruction in Article 120 cases. According to
130 Neal, 68 M.J. at 304.
131 Prather, 69 M.J. at 334, 344, n.9.
132 Medina, 69 M.J. 462.
13 United States v. Stewart, No. NMCCA 201000021 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2011),
review granted, M.J. ,No. 11-04401MC (C.A.A.F., Aug. 10, 2011).
134 See id at 7.
135 See id. at 8.
136 See id at 8-9.
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the change, when applying an affirmative defense to an Article 120 offense,
military judges must now state on the record:
This court is aware of the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces cases interpreting the statutory burden shift for
Article 120, UCMJ, affirmative defenses. Although Article
120(t)(16) places an initial burden on the accused to raise
these affirmative defenses, Congress also placed the
ultimate burden on the Government to disprove them
beyond a reasonable doubt. The CAAF has determined the
Article 120(t)(16) burden shift to be a legal impossibility.
Therefore, to constitutionally interpret Congressional intent
while avoiding prejudicial error, and applying the rule of
lenity, this court severs the language "The accused has the
burden of proving the affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. After the defense meets this
burden," in Article 120(t)(16) and will apply the burden of
proof in accordance with the recommended instructions in
the Military Judges' Benchbook, DA Pam 27-9.137
Thus, the Benchbook approach simply disregards the first burden shift, in an
effort to comply with both C.A.A.F.'s constitutional holdings and the statute
Congress enacted. This highlights one obvious and simply solution:
Congress can further modify Article 120(t)(16) to delete what the
Benchbook instruction has severed.
Given this murky state of affirmative defense procedures and
C.A.A.F.'s concession that a fix for the scheme "clearly rests with
Congress,"' 38 the statute should be amended to provide clarity and increased
protections for both alleged victims and the accused. For example, rather
than require that the accused prove an affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, Congress should amend the statute to treat
an affirmative defense under Article 120 as any other affirmative defense,
thereby allowing its consideration by the trier of fact if the accused can
show some evidence that would support the defense. Once the accused has
met this "some evidence" initial burden, the government would then be
required to disprove the affirmative defense, and prove the required
elements of the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt.
This scheme, consistent with the long history of military justice
affirmative defense procedures, is similar to course of action suggested by
the Military Judges' Benchbook. Congressional codification of those
procedures in Article 120(t)(16), or at least legislative recognition that an
affirmative defense under Article 120 should be employed consistent with
117 DA PAM 27-9, supra note 9796, Approved Change 11-02 (Article 120 Affirmative Defenses),
available at http://www.caaflog.com/wp-content/uploads/BB-change.pdf.
"3 Medina, 69 M.J. at 465, n.5.
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other areas of the UCMJ, should properly balance the due process rights of
the accused against a desire to facilitate sexual assault prosecutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The military justice system alone will not solve the problem of
military sexual assault. The pervasiveness of the issue, evidenced by the
increasing instances of sexual assault and the long history of gender inequity
in the military, demonstrates the need for additional measures beyond a
revised military sexual assault statute. Regardless, the 2007 rewrite of
Article 120 represents a positive effort and first step towards improving the
military legal system's protection of victims, and mitigating the effect of
sexual assault on unit cohesiveness, trust, and overall military readiness.
The purposes for enacting the rewrite reflect Congress' attitude towards the
military sexual assault problem and should be at the forefront when
considering additional revisions and interpretations as to the role of consent
in sexual assault courts-martial. As this issue exemplifies the tension
between an accused's right to a fair trial and the military necessity of
combating a corrosive internal threat, expect the issue of Article 120 to
receive continued attention from the military's appellate courts.
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